Modern avionics systems rely on controlled software upload procedures to install and update flight-critical applications, mission software, operating systems, and configuration data within Integrated Modular Avionics (IMA) platforms. These updates are typically performed on ground using maintenance laptops and standardized loading mechanisms. Because the uploaded software directly determines system functionality and behavior, the software loading interface constitutes a safety-relevant security boundary. Unauthorized modification, incorrect configuration, or corruption of uploaded software can lead to degraded functionality and, in safety-critical contexts, may contribute to hazardous or catastrophic system effects. In current architectures, the primary security mechanism for software loading is based on authenticity and integrity verification of software packages. Software images are digitally signed by the manufacturer and verified onboard before installation or activation. The overall trust concept therefore depends on the correctness of signature validation, the protection of trust anchors, and the controlled execution of maintenance procedures. Communication channel protection may be implemented depending on the specific system architecture, but the core assurance argument remains centered on signature-based verification of the software artifact rather than solely on transport-layer security. The proposed integration of Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) with TLS 1.3 strengthens cryptographic key establishment for the communication channel by deriving symmetric session keys from quantum communication. This introduces additional architectural elements, including quantum key management components and dedicated key delivery interfaces. As a result, the communication architecture and system boundary conditions are modified. The introduction of these elements changes trust relationships, adds interfaces, and potentially alters the overall attack surface of the software upload chain. Despite increasing research on quantum-enhanced communication mechanisms, a structured security risk assessment of their integration into aircraft software loading processes remains limited. In particular, there is a need to evaluate how the modified architecture influences confidentiality, integrity, and availability risks across the complete upload chain from maintenance device to onboard IMA module and how these risks relate to safety-relevant consequences. The integration of additional components requires a systematic examination of potential failure scenarios, misuse cases, and architectural dependencies within a safety-critical environment. This talk presents a comprehensive security risk assessment of a QKD-enhanced TLS 1.3 architecture for aircraft software upload. The assessment considers the full upload process, including maintenance interfaces, communication mechanisms, key management components, and onboard verification functions. The objective is to establish a clear and structured risk perspective of the modified architecture and to identify relevant security concerns introduced by or associated with the integration of quantum-enhanced communication mechanisms in aircraft maintenance systems.